Talking About Civil Rights and Abuse of Process

231 W. Lafayette
__________Thursday, November 6, 2008_________ 


Dear Clerk of Court:

Enclosed for filing, please find Plaintiff’s MCR. 2.002 motion for Waiver or Suspension of Fees and Costs and Plaintiff’s Declaration of facts in support, and proof of mailing. And,

Please except my sincere thanks, in advance, for this portion of your attention, time, and  most kind cooperation in the matter.


Mr. Arthur L Lockett
1755 Michigan Rd.
Port Huron, Michigan

Judge Denise Page Hood
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
Theodore Levin U.S. Courthouse 231 W. Lafayette Blvd., Room 251
Detroit, MI 48226 Courtroom: Room 237 Chambers Telephone Number: (313) 234-5165
Courtroom Deputy – William Lewis: (313) 234-5167 Court Reporter – Cheryl E. Daniel: (313) 961-9082_____
Magistrate Judge Virginia M. Morgan
Room 642
Chambers Telephone Number: (313) 234-5210
Courtroom Deputy – Jane Johnson: (313) 234-5212

231 W. Lafayette
__________Thursday, November 6, 2008_________ 


                           Case No.# 08-14770 
                    JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

IN RE.  Arthur L. Lockett,

Motion For Waiver or Suspension of Fees and Costs

        NOW COMES, In Propria Persona, Plaintiff, Arthur L. Lockett, pursuant to MCR. 2.002 and moves the Court to enter an order granting his request for a  Waiver or Suspension of Fees and Costs, and states as follows:
Defendants are natural persons which bring them within the statement of this rule, and is  receiving a form of public assistance.
    Also in support of this motion, plaintiff plead the following provision of law,  by reference. Rule 2.002 Waiver or Suspension of Fees and Costs for Indigent Persons: A)(1) Only a natural person is eligible for the waiver or suspension of fees and costs under this rule.
        (2) Except as provided in subrule (F), for the purpose of this rule "fees and costs" applies only to filing fees required by law.
        (C) Persons Receiving Public Assistance. If a party shows by ex parte affidavit or otherwise that he or she is receiving any form of public assistance, the payment of fees and costs as to that party shall be suspended.
        D) Other Indigent Persons. If a party shows by ex parte affidavit or otherwise that he or she is unable because of indigency to pay fees and costs, the court shall order those fees and costs either waived or suspended until the conclusion of the litigation.
        G) Reinstatement of Requirement for Payment of Fees and Costs. If the payment
of fees or costs has been waived or suspended under this rule, the court may on its own initiative order the person for whom the fees or costs were waived or suspended to pay those fees or costs when the reason for the waiver or suspension no longer exists.

Plaintiff Arthur L. Lockett’s Ex Parte Affidavit
    NOW COMES, In Pro Se, Plaintiff, Arthur L. Plaintiff, pursuant to  Title 28, Part V,  Chapter 115 § 1746#, and states: I, Mr. Arthur L. Plaintiff, declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States Of America, as represented by my signature below, that the foregoing is true and correct and, of which, includes all statements made in, and in support of Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Disposition or Judgment; Civil Rights and Abuse of Process Complaint.

Respectfully submitted:
_____________________________                                       Thursday, November 6, 2008
Mr. Arthur L. Lockett
1755 Michigan Rd.
Port Huron, Michigan

PH: (810) 990-8678                                                                         

231 W. Lafayette
__________Thursday, November 6, 2008_________ 


Arthur L. Lockett,               
                                                                                                                                                    Hon. Judge Denice Hood
v.                                                                                                                                                 Mag. Judge Morgan
                                                                                                                                                    Case No.# 08-14770 
                                                                                                                                                    JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Deutsche Bank National Company and Trustee;
Marc P. Jerabek (P56856); Fabrizio & Brook, P.C. Moak Realty Co.;
County Of St. Clair; St. Clair County Sheriff Department;
Sheriff deputy Sgt. Buckey; Sgt. Folske; Duputy Stacer; Deputy Hines
Sheriff deputy Young; Baunoch; Philliben; Barr; Bockstanz
St Clair County Probation Department;
City Of Port Huron; Port Huron Police Department;
Officer Mcbride; Officer Malissa ;Detective  Stuewer;
Marty’s Auto Sales; Martin Jacobs;   
Industrial Park Party Story; Kevin  K. Kenaya;
Margaret A. Kelly (P-47210);
Margaret A. Kelly and Associates, P.L.C
Claim as to all Known and Unknown John and
Jane Doe Defendants All Counts
 in  his/her professional, official  and individual capacities,


    NOW COMES, Pro Se, Plaintiff, Arthur L. Lockett, pursuant to Title 28, Part V, Chapter 115 § 1746, and states: I, Mr. Arthur L. Plaintiff, declare certify, verify, and state under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States Of America, as represented by my signature below, that the forthcoming  is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.


    In the United States, the right to petition is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution, and it specifically prohibits Congress from abridging "the right of the people to petition the Government for redress of grievances." Its roots within the colonies can be traced back to the Declaration of Independence. Historically, the right can be traced back further, to English documents such as the Magna Carta, which, by its acceptance by the monarchy, implicitly affirmed the right, and the later Bill of Rights 1689, which explicitly declared the "right of the subjects to petition the king".

    While the prohibition of abridgement of the right to petition originally referred only to the federal legislature the United States Congress and US federal courts, the incorporation doctrine later expanded the protection of the right to its current scope, over all state and federal courts and legislatures and the executive branches of the state and federal governments.  The right to petition includes under its umbrella the right to sue the government.
The letter of the law versus the spirit of the law, idiomatic antithesis.

    When one obeys the letter of the law but not the spirit, he is obeying the literal interpretation of the words (the "letter") of the law, but not the intent of those who wrote the law. Conversely, when one obeys the spirit of the law but not the letter, he is doing what the authors of the law intended, though not adhering to the literal wording. "Law" originally referred to legislative statute, but in the idiom may refer to any kind of rule. Intentionally following the letter of the law but not the spirit may be accomplished through exploiting technicalities, loopholes, and ambiguous language. He may have an habeas corpus out of the Kings Bench or Chancery, though there be no priviledge &c. or in the Court of Common pleas, or Eschequer, for any officer or priviledged person there; upon which Writ the goaler must retourne, by whom he was committed, and the cause of his imprisonment, and if it appeareth that his imprisonment be just, and lawfull, he shall be remaunded to the former Gaoler, but if it shall appeare to the Court, that he was imprisoned against the law of the land, they ought by force of this Statute to deliver him: if it be doubtfull and under consideration, he may be bailed.


    1). On or about November 5th of 2006, Plaintiff entered into the Industrial Park Party Store and approached Defendant Kevin K. Kenaya and asked him to loan Plaintiff $25.00 until the 9th of the month when Plaintiff’s bridge-card become active.
    2). Kenaya agreed indicating that Plaintiff would pay back an additional $25.00 as the loan would be repaid by bridge card as oppose to cash.
    3).On the 9th of November, Plaintiff simply could not find his bridge card.
    4). Plaintiff then went to the party store and explained to Kenaya that he had lost his bridge card and would apply for a new card and pay the $50.00 debt at that time, although upset, Kenaya agreed.
    5). On November 14th of 2006 Plaintiff entered the party store to pay the $50.00 debt he had with the party story.
Plaintiff handed Kenaya the bridge card so that he could remit the $50.00 debt amount.
    6). On November 21st, of 2006, Plaintiff confronted Kenaya concerning funds that had been removed from his bridge-card that Plaintiff had not authorized.
Kenaya indicated that he had only removed $20.00 over the $50.00 amount, for Tax, because Plaintiff was late on the repayment of the $50.00 loan.
    7). Plaintiff demanded the return of the $20.00 and Kenaya refused indicating that he had that he had lost over $5,000.00 on the Michigan verses Ohio State football Game, that had he won he would be glad to give Plaintiff $50.00 dollars.
    8). Plaintiff demanded that Kenaya returned the money, explaining to Kenaya, that Plaintiff needed his money for things like food, that he also needed gas for the car as Plaintiff had to take his wife to work the next day.
    9). Defendant Kenaya continued his refusal indicated that the $20.00 dollars was tax for being late on repayment on the loan, and that Plaintiff knew the game, "you late, you pay."
    10). Plaintiff refused to leave the store without first making a police report.
    11). Plaintiff explained to Kenaya, that he would see him in jail for taking that money off his bridge-card, that it was a felony, as well as a federal offence.
    12). Kenaya became very angry and began attempts to employ persons under his employment, as well as persons coming into the store off the streets, to expel Plaintiff from the store.
    14). When that didn’t work for him, he called the police and indicated to the police that Plaintiff was an unwanted vagrant harassing his customers.
    15). At Plaintiff’s trial Kenaya testified that it was Kenaya who sought aid from
the same people he had first indicated Plaintiff were harassing.
See trial transcripts at page 17 Q&A – 17:
Q) When you where close to him there, did you observed anything about his–about him?
A) I mean, I don’t want to say he could have been drunk, I don’t know.

Q) Could you tell whether or not he had been drinking?
A) I can, I can, yeah.

Q) Did you smell any alcoholic beverages?
A) No, I couldn’t.

Q) All right.
A) Now he’s getting, louder and stuff. I was just getting really frustrated. He got loud with this gentleman here, I mean, he–this gentleman didn’t say anything.

Q) You’re talking about the gentleman in the kind of greenish coat.
A) The bluish coat, yeah. Now I’ve been telling him the whole time, “Plaintiff, just please leave man.”

Q) Your gesturing——
A) I’m getting loud too. He knew this gentleman here and I had asked this gentleman, you know, please, could you just escort him out. You can probably see the hand gestures that I show him, you know. Yeah, I’m telling him right now, you know, please escort him out, he’s getting pretty bad; he wouldn’t leave. The last thing I wanted to do was call the police on him. I don’t want nobody going to jail for something, can I say–stupid?

Feeling  extremely annoyed, at the prospects of going to prison Kenaya decided to strike first, and called the police. See trial transcripts at page nine:

Q) ……when you called the police, what did you tell them?
A) “Oh, there’s an individual here that is making a lot of racket and confrontational with the customers, and, you know, he wouldn’t leave.” They asked for his name, I believe, and I told them his name and they said they’d be over in a minute.

Q) All right, when the police got there, what happened?
A) There was four, five of them, I believe. They kind of surrounded him in different positions, and the one lady officer, I remember just saying, you know, “The gentleman wants you to leave; just leave the store

Q) All right, then what happened?
A) And I don’t recall, but he did reach in his pocket and that’s when the police kind of, kind of attacked him and held him down and he said he was just going for his wallet and that’s when he kind of resisted and they just handcuffed him after that.

Q) All right, and did they then take him out of the store?
A) Yes, they took him out of the store.

Q) And what did you, what did you do then?
A) I followed them out of the store just to see, you know, what was going to go on and they took him
to the car and surprisingly he showed great strength. There was five of them trying to put him in the car and he wasn’t going in the car.

Q) What did he do?
A) He was standing still, showing great strength. I never seen anything like that before.

Q) Well, I mean, what, what kind of actions was he, was he doing?
A) Oh, he was just yelling and he was like real stiff and they were trying to put his head down and they couldn’t get him, and they asked him “If you don’t cooperate”, you
know, “we’re going to have to taser you.”

Q) And what happened then?
A) They tasered him.

Q) And then what?
A) He dropped, he dropped.

Q) Were they able to get him in the car then?
A) Yes they were.

Q) How far away from this—
A) From the

Q) ———where the police were——
A) from the front door to where the cops were positioned, they were closer to Dove Street, so I’m going to say about 50 feet.

Q) So you were watching this across the parking lot——
A) Yeah.

Q) ——from about 50 feet?
A) Yes.

Q) Now, does, does your store have any kind of security equipment in the store?
A) Yes, we do.

Q) After this incident back in November, have you seen the defendant?
A) Yes, I have.

Q) More than once?
A) Just one time.

Q) When was that?
A) It was the day after that I got the subpoena. He had came (sic) into work and I was kind of shocked that I had seen him.

Q) How long ago was that?
A) About three, four weeks ago.

Q) All right, he cane into the store?
A) Yes, he did.

Q) Was there anyone else in the store?
A) There was a gentleman in the back room.

Q) And what happened?
A) He had told me that if he—

Q) Who is “he”?
A) The defendant had told me if I showed up during trial that he would kill me.

Q) What did you do in response to that?
A) I mean, at the time, like I said I knew the individual. knew he wouldn’t like act on it from knowing him for the past year, but after, you know, seeing what had happened at the Virginia Tech ordeal, you know, you don’t know what somebody’s capable of.

Q) Is that when you reported it?
A) Yeah, yes, I did.

Q) How long after you became aware of the Virginia Tech?
A) Hour or two; I forget. I don’t recall when I called.

Q) But it was at that same day?
A) Yes, it was the same day.

Q) Okay. And you reported the incident that had happened earlier?
A) Yes, I did.

Q) Initially, you——because you had known him, is that correct?
A) Yeah, he never caused me any problems before, like I said, for three, four, five times a day he would come in, purchase stuff.

Q) Okay. But you simply wanted to make a record of it?
A) Yeah, I just didn’t know what was——

Upon cross examination Kenaya perjured himself.


Q) Now, you stated that for the previous year Mr. Locket had come into your store three, four times a day, is that correct?
A) Yes, he has.

Q) And purchased things, is that correct?
A) Yes, he has.

Q) What kinds of things did he normally purchase there?
A) Cigarettes, alcohol, pop, chips.

Q) Okay. And did he use food stamps or his bridge card?
A) No, he didn’t, ma’am, neither.

Q) Not ever?
A) Neither.

Q) Do you take bridge cards there?
A) No, we don’t.

Q) You don’t have one of those machines, or——
A) No, we don’t.

Q) Now, when he came in that day, you’re saying that he was
asking for money?
A) Yes, he was.

Q) And he, he wasn’t discussing a bridge card with you?
A) No, he wasn’t.

Q) Now, had you ever told him no before?
A) I told him no a couple of times, yes I have.

Q) And those other times, what did he do?
A) He just simply left. I told him I didn’t have no money for him, and he left. I didn’t want to make a habit of giving——you know, he said he was, he needed some help, so, you know, I give him ten, fifteen dollars, and he always paid me back.

Q) Now, on this day, did he believe that there was an issue with a bridge card with you? Did he mention it at all with you?
A) No, he did not.

Q) Now, did Mr. Plaintiff at any time ask you to call the police?
A) Yeah, he had told me——I had told him, “I’m calling the police”, and he said, “Go ahead, call the police.”

Q) Did he actually ask you to call the police?
A) No, he did not.

Q) Did he, he tell you that he, he wanted to talk to the police?
A) No he did not.

Q) When the police came, you say they asked him to leave, as well?
A) Yeah, they positioned themselves and they just asked the gentleman to, you know.

Q) And what else did Mr. Plaintiff say besides, “No, I don’t want to leave”; isn’t it true that he, he tried to explain that he had an issue with——
 A) No, he didn’t.

Q) ——some twenty dollars.
A) No, he didn’t.
Q) You did not hear him say that to the police?
A) Well, the detective asked me what was this about, and I said he wanted to borrow twenty dollars.

Q) …….did you overhear what Mr. Plaintiff said to the police?
 A) No, I did not.

MS. KELLY: I have no further questions……

The jury never got the opportunity to see the electronic transaction activity that this Court

is about to see below:

    16). In this document, as shown above, this Court can readily see that Kenaya was perjuring himself when he testify that he neither accepted or did any kind of business concerning bridge-cards in the Industrial Park Store..
    17). From this document this Court can readily see that Kenaya was perjuring himself when he testified that his store did not have the  machines necessary for removing the benefits  possessed in bridge-cards
    18). There are no legitimate reasons whatsoever for Kenaya to lie concerning bridge-card transactions conducted in his store, unless Kenaya was deliberately attempting to deceive  the jury.  For example:
    19). Had there been a bridge-card transaction between Kenaya and Plaintiff, or not, Kenaya still would not have had a good reason to lie concerning the store’s ability to except bridge-cards, unless Kenaya was attempting to assist the state in its malicious prosecution of Plaintiff.
    20). Put another way: Kenaya and the Industrial Park Store, at all times relevant, had a legal right to except bridge-cards transactions there in their store. That fact makes clear that this is not the reason he lied concerning bridge-cards transactions taking place in his store.
    21). Another reason Kenaya might feel the need to lie would be to attempt to hide his illegal conduct and criminal activities concerning funds he removes from Plaintiff’s and countless other bridge-cards.
    22). Either way, Kenaya did perjury himself on a matter that was critical to the State’s case and Plaintiff’s defense. And that type of perjury carries a five year prison term.
    23). Something motivated Kenaya to make that leap, was it Money, Fear of Prison or a Promise from the State?
    24). Plaintiff contends, it is all three, Kenaya made a false report that night of November the 21st,  of 2006. The police in response employed excessive use of force against Plaintiff. The entire time, Kenaya has stolen money from Plaintiff’s Bridge Card. 
    25). The most important of the three, is the fact that the police has assaulted
Plaintiff, at the whim of Kenaya, by way of excessive use of force.
    26). Plaintiff’s filing his complaint with the Port Huron Police Department, was the last thing the Police and Kenaya needed. 
    27). Kenaya’s efforts to deceive the jury was successful as the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges.
    28). The Framers of the U.S. Constitution considered the deprivation of counsel repugnant to basic principles of criminal justice. According to the Framers, the assistance of counsel is a critical element in maintaining an Accusatorial System of justice. An accusatorial system places the burden on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendant. This is opposed to an Inquisitorial System, wherein guilt or innocence is determined through interrogation of the defendant. as in this case. In Gideon, defendant Clarence Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with breaking and entering a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. Under Florida law, this was a felony. Gideon valiantly represented himself, but he was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Gideon was represented by Abe Fortas, who had been appointed by the Court. Through Fortas, Gideon argued that the right to counsel was a fundamental right and essential to a fair trial. The Court agreed, stating that the "noble ideal" of a fair trial cannot be achieved "if the poor man charged with a crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him." The Court reversed Gideon’s conviction, holding that all states must provide counsel to indigent defendants who face serious criminal charges.
    29). The legal basis for the decision was the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This clause forbids states to enact laws denying due process of law to citizens of the United States. On retrial, represented by appointed counsel, Gideon was acquitted. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914, (2002), is governed by the cause and prejudice standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct.2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).
    30). Defense counsel’s failure to speak with her client also violates several
standards articulated in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. For example, the Duty to Keep Client Informed Standard states, "(a) Defense counsel should keep the client informed of the developments in the case and the progress of preparing the defense and should promptly comply with reasonable requests for information" and "(b) Defense counsel should explain developments in the case to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3.8 (3d ed. 1993).
    31). Although Plaintiff bears the burden of proving counsel’s ineffectiveness out of deference for counsel’s decisions and trial strategy. See id. The illogic of applying Strickland to these facts is manifest in that there are no conceivable tactical or strategic reasons for defense counsel to fail to consult with her client prior to trial. Such a meeting is vital if counsel were competently seeking to develop Plaintiff’s defense.
    32). Counsel did not meet with Plaintiff for more than two minutes at any given time, and only once prior to the date of Plaintiff’s trial and that concerned thee other case the defendants, the City of Port Huron, had brought against Plaintiff.
    32). The Plaintiff was unable to confide in his lawyer, and counsel refused to pursue investigative leads, witnesses for the defense, nor did she seek and obtain available exculpatory impeachment evidence in the face of being directed by Plaintiff to its existence.
    33). The Supreme Court has long recognized that there is a duty to investigate before trial and that, by failing to consult with Plaintiff counsel did not perform this duty during a critical stage.
    34). The trial court in this case should have done better upholding the Constitution and take but a few additional moments to consider Plaintiff’s complaints concerning appointed counsel meaningfully, to make certain that Defendant Kelly was truly ready for trial. In doing so, the trial court would have learned of counsel’s lack of representation, and appointed new counsel as Plaintiff had requested prior to his trial. The time the trial court saved only lead to greater and otherwise unnecessary expenditure of time and judicial resources, less not forget to mention the toil on Plaintiff.
Effective representation must mean more than simply showing up and giving a poor performance. If truth seeking is to play some role in our criminal justice system, defense attorneys must exert at least some effort to explore the truth so that, if there is exculpatory evidence available in favor of her client, they can present it." Mitchell, 560 N.W.2d at 622 n.7.
    35). The Supreme Court has considered the pre-trial period to be a critical stage of the proceedings since at least 1932, when it handed down Powell. This is not a new rule of law. A new rule of law "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation" on the states or the federal government. Alternatively, a court announces a new rule of law "if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1989). It cannot seriously be argued that defense counsel’s obligation to consult with her client at least once is a new or novel obligation being imposed on the government or that the Supreme Court’s cases in Powell, Strickland, and Cronic do not compel this result.
    36). Plaintiff specifically instructed his defendant Kelly, to obtain copies of the transactions that had occurred on Plaintiff’s bridge card. And counsel failed to do so without a single reason whatsoever.
    37). Counsel refusal to obtain the requested documents allowed Defendant Kenaya to take the witness stand and lie to the jury and perjure himself with reckless abandonment.
    38). In the face of the above allegations, defendant Kelly’s only response was that she was ready for trial. When in fact she clearly wasn’t.
    Plaintiff contends  defendant Kelly  acted in concert with thee other defendants, the City of Port Huron, the Port Huron Police and Kenaya …to deprive Plaintiff of his liberty  …and proper redress.
    39). For example: Plaintiff had every right to seek to resolve the issue of the money that had been illegally removed from his bridge-card the night he confronted kenaya in the Industrial Park Store.
    40). The police jumped the gun, and exacted excessive use of force against
Plaintiff causing great bodily injury to Plaintiff’s person, subjecting themselves to criminal and civil liabilities.
    41). Upon his, before daylight, released from the St Clair County Jail, Plaintiff waited until 8:00 a.m. and then went to the Port Huron Police Department to file a complaint against the police that had assaulted him, and against Kenaya for the false report that cause the assault.
    42). The police refused to allow Plaintiff in the building, therefore Plaintiff called the State Police, who has not done anything, and the FBI.
    43). The State Police instructed Plaintiff to attempt to contact the Chief of the Port Huron Police Department. Plaintiff did so to no avail.
    44). A week a so later after repeated attempts, plaintiff was finally able to file his complaint…See: Port Huron Police complaint number: 06-17636.
    45). In an effort to prevent Plaintiff from being able to bring a civil action against the defendants, the City decided to bring criminal charges against Plaintiff..
    46). As a result of this decision, the Defendants needed to show that Plaintiff was in the Industrial Park Store illegally. This required the defendants’ to put the perjured testimony of kenaya and the police to the jury, resulting in the unlawful conviction of Plaintiff. And, the Miscarriage of Justice.  
    47). Prior to thee above criminal conduct, the defendants tried to convict Plaintiff of harboring a child runaway, knowing full well that the charges had absolutely on basis in fact whatsoever.
    48). Defendant Kelly was appointed to represent Plaintiff on that case also, where defendant and plaintiff had the one two minute meeting prior to both cases.
    49). The police lied in their police report indicating that they had removed the child for the home of Plaintiff at 1787 Michigan Rd. to secure the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest.
    50). All of this came about only after Plaintiff had filed his complaint against the police of the Port Huron Police Department and Kenaya.
    51). Plaintiff complaint is assigned to Detective Stuewer of the Port Huron Police
Department, of whom,  like appointed counsel, has not spoken  to Plaintiff concerning this complaint.
    52). Plaintiff is denied the equal protection of the law at the hands of the police of Port Huron  and  St. Clair County. And his court appointed counsel.
    53). The right to counsel includes the right to representation on direct appeal from any criminal conviction. Defendant Kelly has abandoned Plaintiff and thereby denied Plaintiff a proper appeal. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct.2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).

Published by loclock7

61 year old father of three and 6 grandchildren Former SC4 Student

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