Fighting An Injustice

Presentment Of Claim Of Actual Innocence
    Defendant Appellant contends that he is actually innocence of the crime for which he was convicted. That law enforcement officers, in their zeal to win and convict, manipulate or intimidated witnesses into false testimony, suppressed evidence that impeaches the prosecution’s own witnesses, evidence that goes to the defendant’s innocence, in this case, the chances of an accurate jury verdict were greatly diminished by misconduct. This type of "actual innocence claim" is not a substantive claim in itself, but is a "gateway" through which a petitioner must pass to obtain review of defaulted substantive claims.

    Defendant Appellant claim of innocence was not a basis for his relief; instead his actual relief would be based on the validity of his Strickland and Brady claims. Schlup’s innocence claim thus was " ‘not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.’ " Id. at 315, 115 S.Ct. at 861 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S.Ct. at 862). Mainly, in failing to address this issues , the lower court abused its discretion, requiring reversal. Kenaya committed the act of lying, making verifiably false statements on a material matter under oath, or affirmation, in a court of law or in other various sworn statements in writing. Perjury is a crime because as a witness Kenaya had sworn to tell the truth and, for the credibility of the court, witness testimony must be relied upon as being truthful. Perjury by all standards  is considered a serious offense as it was used to usurp the power of the courts, resulting in a miscarriages of justice.

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One Comment Add yours

  1. Arthur L. says:

    WILLIAM MCNEIL, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 113 S. Ct. 1980, 124 L. Ed. 2d 21, 61 U.S.L.W. 4468. Moreover, given the clarity of the statutory text, it is certainly not a "trap for the unwary." It is no doubt true that there are cases in which a litigant proceeding without counsel may make a fatal procedural error, but the risk that a lawyer will be unable to understand the exhaustion requirement is virtually nonexistent. Our rules of procedure are based on the assumption that litigation is normally conducted by lawyers. While we have insisted that the pleadings prepared by prisoners who do not have access to counsel be liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and have held that some procedural rules must give way because of the unique circumstance of incarceration, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (pro se prisoner\’s notice of appeal deemed filed at time of delivery to prison authorities), we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. As we have noted before, "in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law." Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).

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